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A spreading Islamic insurgency engulfs the
amorphous and ungoverned border between
Afghanistan andPakistan.After initial victories by
the United States and the Northern Alliance in
autumn 2001, hundreds of Taliban and al Qaeda
fighters fled Afghanistan to seek refuge across the
border in Pakistan’s rugged northwest. Since
2007, the number of ambushes, militant offen-
sives, and targeted assassinationshas risen sharply
across Afghanistan, while suicide bombers and
pro-Taliban insurgents sweep through settled
areas of Pakistan at an alarming pace. For better
and forworse, Pakistanwill remain the fulcrumof
U.S. policy in the region—its leaders continue to
provide vital counterterrorism cooperation and
have received close to $20 billion in assistance
from the United States, yet elements associated
with its national intelligence agency, Inter-Services
Intelligence, covertly assist militant proxy groups
destabilizing the region.
Insteadof “surging” into this volatile region, the
United States must focus on limiting cross-border
movementalongtheAfghanistan-Pakistan frontier
and supporting local Pakistani security forces with
a smallnumberofU.S.SpecialForcespersonnel.To
improve fighting capabilities and enhance coopera-
tion,Washington and Islamabadmust increase the
number of Pakistani officers trained through the
U.S. Department ofDefense InternationalMilitary
Education andTraining program. In addition,U.S.
aid to Pakistanmust bemonitoredmore closely to
ensurePakistan’smilitarydoesnotdivertU.S. assis-
tance to the purchase of weapons systems that can
be used against its chief rival, India. Most impor-
tant, U.S. policymakersmust stop embracing a sin-
glePakistani leaderorbackinga singlepoliticalpar-
ty, as they unwisely did with PervezMusharraf and
the late Benazir Bhutto.
America’s actions are not passively accepted
by the majority of Pakistan’s population, and
officials in Islamabad cannot afford to be per-
ceived as putting America’s interests above those
of their own people. Because the long-term suc-
cess of this nuclear-armed Muslim-majority
country depends on the public’s repudiation of
extremism, and our continued presence in Af-
ghanistan is addingmore fuel to violent religious
radicalism, our mission in the region, as well as
our tactics, our objectives, and our interests,
must all be reexamined.
Pakistan and the Future of U.S. Policy
byMalou Innocent
_____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Malou Innocent is a foreign policy analyst at the Cato Institute. She recently came back from a fact-finding trip to
Pakistan.
Executive Summary
No. 636 April 13, 2009
361896_PA636_1stClass:361896_PA636_1stClass  3/25/2009  6:12 AM  Page 1
Introduction
Since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have
found sanctuary in the vast unpoliced region
of western Pakistan, known as the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas. Pro-Taliban insur-
gents cross FATA’s highly porous border with
Afghanistan to kill U.S. and NATO troops.
The insurgency is spilling over into Pakistan’s
two westernmost provinces adjoining FATA,
Balochistan and North-West Frontier Prov-
ince, with frequent reports of beheaded
women, kidnapped Pakistani soldiers, and
mutilated tribal elders. In some areas of FATA,
relentless Taliban incursions have already led
to the complete collapse of civilian and tribal
administration. In addition, former CIA direc-
tor General Michael Hayden believed the next
attack on the U.S. homeland is likely to origi-
nate from western Pakistan. The danger is
growing, with violence spreading to Pakistan’s
large urban centers, including Peshawar,
Karachi, and Islamabad. Political observers
have grown wary of the integrity of Pakistan’s
military command structure, and are con-
cerned about militants taking over its nuclear
weapons.
All three issues—thenature of the spreading
insurgency, its impacton theU.S.-NATOeffort
in Afghanistan, and the security of Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal—are important to America’s
security. But policymakers must remain flexi-
ble with leaders in Islamabad. Paradoxically,
our dependence on them constrains the use-
fulness of their support. For example, three-
quarters of provisions for U.S. and NATO
troops must travel via FATA’s Khyber Pass.
This tribal agency has experienced some of the
grisliest fighting. Because Khyber is the most
vital military supply line into landlocked
Afghanistan, it will be jeopardized if security
conditions worsen. Other supply routes are
being considered. An agreement with Georgia
and Kazakhstan has been reached, and talks
are ongoing with Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan—
the latter having expelled U.S. forces from its
territory in 2005 in a dispute over human
rights issues.Kyrgyzstan’s government recently
voted toendAmerica’suseof itsManasairbase
followingRussia’s announcementofbillionsof
dollars in new aid. While the move may have
been political, after the closure of Uzbekistan’s
air base, Kyrgyzstan’s is the only U.S. military
facility left in the Central Asia region.
Given the aftermath of the August 2008
conflict inGeorgia, establishing a new north-
ern corridor inside Russia’s sphere of influ-
ence may require Washington to offer con-
cessions to Moscow, such as offering an
unofficial quid pro quo by halting further
NATO expansion, or delaying the proposed
installation of long-range ground-based mis-
sile defense interceptors in Poland and amid-
course guidance radar in the Czech Republic.
Another alternative would be routes
through Iran, which has linguistic, geograph-
ic, and historical ties to Afghanistan. In recent
decades, Tehran has had more influence over
the country’s Tajik-dominated north rather
than its Pashtun-dominated south. Despite
three decades of hostile U.S.-Iran relations,
the interests of Tehran and Washington have
overlapped occasionally, most recently when
Iran quietly supported America’s effort to
oust the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. But
until Washington either withdraws from
Afghanistan or establishes warmer relations
with Iran or Russia, logistical and geopolitical
issues mean that U.S. policy in the region, at
least for the foreseeable future, will remain
hostage to events inside Pakistan.
To make matters worse, Washington’s
diminished leverage over Islamabad means
elements of its military and intelligence ser-
vice may continue to take advantage of
America’s dependence by failing to tackle ter-
rorism more vigorously. As former secretary
of state Condoleezza Rice once observed:
America’s al-Qaida policy wasn’t work-
ing because our Afghanistan policy
wasn’t working. And our Afghanistan
policy wasn’t working because our
Pakistan policy wasn’t working . . . al-
Qaida was both client of and patron to
the Taliban, which in turn was sup-
ported by Pakistan. Those relation-
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ships provided al-Qaida with a power-
ful umbrella of protection, and we had
to sever them.1
Except for Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan and
other tribally based militant groups striking
targets in the Pakistani government, most
Pakistani defense officials do not perceive the
original AfghanTaliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, the
Haqqani network, and other specific proxy
groups as their enemies, but as a means of
extending their geopolitical reach into Af-
ghanistan and throughout the region. Until
rogue elements of Pakistan’s state apparatus
make a fundamental shift in strategic priori-
ties, U.S. and NATO attempts to stabilize
eastern and southern Afghanistan remain
futile.
In the short-term, the highly porous
Afghanistan-Pakistan border will continue to
be used as a giant sieve, allowing militants
based in FATA to gradually expand their polit-
ical and economic influence inside Afghani-
stan and undermine the efforts of coalition
forces. If U.S. strikes and incursions launched
into FATA from Afghanistan are to be suc-
cessful theymust coordinate heavilywith civil-
ian andmilitary officials in Islamabad.
In the medium-to-long term, Washington
must be prepared to accept a less-than-defini-
tive victory in this region. Given the magni-
tude of the atrocities unleashed on September
11, removing both al Qaeda and the Taliban
organization that sheltered them was the
appropriate level of retaliation. The question
of why we remain in Afghanistan, however, is
seldom raised.
The Sisyphean task of nation building
Afghanistan will undermine our economic
and geostrategic interests. “If we set ourselves
the objective of creating some sort of aCentral
AsianValhalla over there, wewill lose,” warned
U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates to
members of the House Armed Services Com-
mittee in January 2009. “Because nobody in
the world has that much time, patience, or
money, to be honest.”2
Critics of U.S. military interventions have
been too quick to invoke the Vietnam analo-
gy in the past. But in Afghanistan, it is quite
possible that U.S. and NATO forces “could
fight for decades, win every discrete engage-
ment, and still not achieve anything remote-
ly resembling victory.”3
The Recent History of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan
Border
When considering what steps must be tak-
en to contain the region’s insurgency, it helps
to understand the troubled history and the
shaky foundation on which that region now
rests. One impediment to the area’s long-term
viability is theDurand Line, the nebulous bor-
der Pakistan shares with Afghanistan.
In 1893, British civil servant, Sir Henry
Mortimer Durand, and his Afghan counter-
part, Amir Abdul Rahman Khan, delineated
Afghanistan as a buffer with which to protect
British India’s northwest frontier fromRussian
armies. But like many acts of British colonial
administration, the Durand Line was born out
of political andmilitary expediency, as well as a
fundamental neglect of the region’s ethnic
composition. “Tribes, sometimes even villages,
were divided,” recorded Sir Martin Ewans, for-
mer British head of chancery in Kabul.4
Because it was created without regard to
the wishes of native Pashtun tribes, the
region’s inhabitants ignored the border.
Having endured successive waves of Persian,
Greek, Arab, Turk, and Mughal invaders, the
zealously independent and battle-tested
tribes repeatedly repulsed Britain’s colonial
armies, leaving a thin slice of rugged territory
unconquered by the Raj. Because Britain’s
interference only exacerbated conflict, and
the people of this region preferred to be gov-
erned by their own tribal customs, the British
instituted the colonial policy of noninterfer-
ence, or “masterly inactivity,” in the internal
affairs of the Pashtun tribes.
Although each tribe was collectively re-
sponsible for law and order in its own area,
over time, the region’s deep ravines and iso-
lated valleys became a breeding ground for
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smugglers and drug traders, outlaws and ter-
rorists. The mountainous tribal belt strad-
dlingwhatwould later become the imaginary
border between modern-day Pakistan and
Afghanistan eventually earned the moniker
“Yaghistan,” or “Land of the Rebels.”5
The region and the policy of noninterfer-
ence were later inherited by the independent
government of Pakistan under Governor
General Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1947. To
this day, this tribal area remains within the
territorial confines of Pakistan yet formally
outside of its constitution.
Relations between Afghanistan and Paki-
stan did not have an auspicious beginning.
When Pakistan sought admission to the
United Nations, Afghanistan cast the only dis-
senting vote.6 The main factor was a dispute
over the Pashtun tribal areas adjoining both
countries. Pashtuns are Afghanistan’s largest
ethnic group, about 13.5 million of the coun-
try’s 31million people. Despite being aminor-
ity in Pakistan, more Pashtuns live in Pakistan
than in Afghanistan (about 25.4million).
Over the decades, various Afghan leaders
refused to recognize theDurandLine andwant-
ed to annexPakistan’s Pashtun-dominated trib-
al regions, including FATA, Balochistan, and
North-West Frontier Province, forming a sepa-
rate and independent “Pakhtunistan.”7 Both
countries almost went to war over the issue in
1954.
The Turning Point
With only a few minor periods of discord,
Washington and Islamabad were strategic
partners throughout the ColdWar. But Paki-
stan evolved from a marginal U.S. partner to
a pivotal U.S. ally in December 1979, when
the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan.8 To
Washington the invasion was a nightmare,
coming just one month after the seizure of
the American embassy in Tehran and less
than five years after America’s retreat from
Vietnam. For many policymakers, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan solidified the im-
pression that countries around theworld nei-
ther respected nor feared the United States.9
In Washington, President Jimmy Carter’s
National Security Advisor, ZbigniewBrzezinski,
proposed a plan to counter the Soviet offensive.
It was initially a nonlethal propaganda and psy-
chological operations campaign, but it soon
became a plan to bleed the Soviets dry.
At the time, the CIA had few intelligence
sources in Central Asia, and Pakistan, a long-
time ally sharing a border with Afghanistan,
became the logical choice to assist the covert
operation. Pakistan’s leader, General Moham-
medZia ul-Haq, who only two years earlier had
overthrown (and later hanged) civilian prime
minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, turned down
Carter’s initial offer of $400 million as “pea-
nuts.”10
General Zia was later rewarded with a five-
year, $3.2 billion military aid package from
President Ronald Reagan, plus permission to
purchase nuclear-capable F-16 fighters previ-
ously available only to NATO allies and
Japan.11 From 1982 through 1990, the United
States gave over $4 billion in assistance to
Pakistan.12 Saudi Arabia agreed to match that
aid dollar for dollar, as the Saudis were a long-
time enemy of Moscow and a steadfast ally of
Islamabad.
Under this U.S.–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia
alliance, the United States provided training,
coordination, and strategic intelligence; the
Saudis provided the money and recruitment
of Afghan mujahideen (Islamic “holy war-
riors”); and the Pakistanis provided their ter-
ritory as a base of operations and acted as the
sole liaison with Afghan forces.13
The Pakistani national intelligence agency,
Inter-Services Intelligence, funded by the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency and Saudi Arabia,
directed the bulk of the money and military
hardware to the most radical and intolerant
factions of the mujahidin, such as Hizb-i-
Islami (the “Party of Islam”) led byGulbuddin
Hekmatyar, a radical Afghan guerrilla leader
who emerged as the ISI’s most powerful
client.14
ISI officers insisted to CIA officials that
Hekmatyar was the most efficient at killing
Soviets; they based their assessment on
reviews of battlefield damage reports and the
movement of weapons shipments, and they
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discovered that “the best organized fighters”
were led by Hekmatyar.15 ISI officers also
assumed they could controlHekmatyarmore
easily than other mujahideen leaders.
The Soviet–Afghan War was yet another
chapter in an ongoing saga between Pakistan
andAfghanistan. Islamabad viewed the Soviet–
AfghanWarasanopportunity toensure thatan
Islamic government aligned with Pakistan,
rather than a secular pro-Soviet government
aligned with India, would come to power in
Kabul after the Soviets withdrew. In addition,
Islamabad’s recent memory of losing East
Pakistan (which secededwith India’s assistance
in 1971 and became the independent country
of Bangladesh) made many of its leaders even
more fearful of irredentist Afghan leaders stir-
ring up trouble in its geopolitical back yard—a
loss of “strategic depth” they believed would
leave their country evenmore vulnerable to the
next full-scale Indian assault.16
Given the CIA’s limited knowledge of the
localculture, theydeferredtothePakistanis, the
experts in the region. But the CIA overlooked
that the ISI intended to exert its influence over
Afghanistan and deny India a chance to gain
power by supporting their preferredproxies. To
this end, the ISI did not sponsormore tolerant
Afghan nationalist factions of the resistance.
That decision profoundly shaped the mission
and its aftermath. By aiding the most extreme
factions of the mujahideen, the anti-Soviet
jihad facilitated the emergence of Islamic fun-
damentalism in Afghanistan and, later, the
advance of a Taliban government that would
one day provide shelter to the al Qaeda organi-
zation directly responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
Pakistan’s own religious character altered
significantly during the 1980s. “School text-
bookswere overhauled to ensure their ideolog-
ical purity,” writes Zahid Hussain in Frontline
Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam. “Books
deemed un-Islamic were removed from syl-
labuses and university libraries. It was made
compulsory for civil servants to pray five times
aday.”17General Zia also enacted Islamist ordi-
nances within the court system, encouraged
prayer in the barracks, and posted an imam in
every military unit.18 During Zia’s rule, the
country’s Sunni-Islamic push was geared not
only toward combating infidel Soviets, but
toward countering the rise of the Shiite revolu-
tion across the border in Iran.
Before the Soviet–Afghan War, the tribes
and the independent government of Pakistan
shared power in FATA. During the war, when
FATA andNorth-West Frontier Province func-
tionedas the rearbaseof theAfghanresistance,
a third entity emerged, that of jihadist mili-
tants. In FATA, Pakistan’s army and ISI over-
saw the mushrooming of religious schools
called madaris (plural of madrassah) financed
by the Saudi government.19
While propagating militancy was not the
original intent when madaris were first estab-
lished in 11th-century Baghdad, in the Paki-
stan of the mid-1980s madaris were aimed at
indoctrinatingMuslim youths in radical inter-
pretations of Islam andpropagating amilitant
anti-Western worldview.20 Ahmed Rashid,
author of Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Funda-
mentalism inCentral Asia, estimates that in 1971
only 900 madaris existed in all of Pakistan. By
1988, that number had swelled to 8,000—with
another 25,000 unregistered.21
Jilted Partner
U.S. relations with Islamabad soon cooled
after the signingof theGenevaAccords inApril
1988,which ratified the official termsof Soviet
withdrawal.22 In 1990, U.S. Ambassador to
Pakistan Robert Oakley went to Islamabad to
deliver a sternmessage:Americawouldbe insti-
tuting sanctions against Pakistan under the
Pressler Amendment of 1985, which specified
that nomilitary equipment or technology was
to be sold or transferred to the country unless
President Reagan could certify that Pakistan
did not have a nuclear device, was not develop-
ing a nuclear device, andwas not acquiring the
technology tomake a nuclear device. 23
General Zia would later tell CIA director
William Casey that being an ally of the
United States was equivalent to living on the
banks of an enormous river: “The soil is won-
derfully fertile, but every four or eight years
the river changes course, and you may find
yourself alone in a desert.”24
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After the Soviets withdrew from Afghani-
stan and America imposed sanctions on
Pakistan, ISI decided to redirect the proxy
methods employed against the Soviets toward
jihad against India in Kashmir. By 1992,
Afghanistan’s Soviet-installed regime col-
lapsed and gave way to civil war among rival
guerrilla factions of the mujahideen. The two
most notable groups were a Sunni Pashtun
movement known as the Taliban, led by
Mullah Mohammed Omar, and the Tajik-
dominatedmovementknownas theNorthern
Alliance, led by Ahmad ShahMassoud.25
The Taliban captured the important
southern city of Kandahar in the winter of
1994, and seized Kabul in 1996. Pakistan
would be one of three countries to formally
recognize the Taliban as the official govern-
ment of Afghanistan.26 In return for the ISI’s
assistance, the Taliban allowed Pakistan’s
army to operate dozens of training camps in
Afghanistan for the struggle against India in
Kashmir.
Former Pakistani president and retired
armyGeneral PervezMusharraf said at a press
conference in Islamabad in 2000, “Afghani-
stan’s majority ethnic Pashtuns have to be on
our side . . . the Taliban cannot be alienated by
Pakistan. We have a national security interest
there.”27
Throughout the 1990s, Washington put
little to no pressure on the Taliban’s biggest
benefactors: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Even
after the CIA documented links between the
ISI, the Taliban, and Osama bin Laden, the
region remained on the periphery of U.S. poli-
cymaking. The U.S. embassy in Kabul was
closed in 1988, and the region’s closest CIA
station, based in Islamabad, did not even have
Afghanistan on a list of intelligence-gathering
priorities. But Pakistan’s recognition of
Afghanistan’s repressive Taliban regime, cou-
pled with General Musharraf’s overthrow of
his country’s democratically elected Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif in October 1999,
turned his country into an international pari-
ah. Just as the anti-Soviet jihad 10 years earlier
had forged close ties betweenWashington and
Islamabad, tectonic shifts in the geopolitical
landscape would bring the estranged allies
together once again.
U.S.-Pakistan Relations,
Post-9/11
Two days after the September 11th attacks,
U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage handed a single sheet of paper to
GeneralMahmoudAhmed, director general of
the ISI and a vociferous supporter of the
Taliban.28 Printed on the sheetwere sevennon-
negotiable demands for Pakistan’s leader,
GeneralMusharraf. In return forWashington’s
repeal of previous sanctions, a five-year aid
package worth $3 billion, and the forgiveness
of outstanding debt to the United States and
other Western nations, Pakistan would allow
“basing, staging and overflight support” for all
U.S. aircraft for the war in Afghanistan, allow
Americaaccess tonavalbases andairports, pro-
vide intelligence sharingandcooperation,drop
support for the Taliban, and purge the upper
echelons of itsmilitary and nuclear facilities of
religious extremists.29 Musharraf accepted
Washington’s demands.
He also agreed to banKashmiri rebel groups
Lashkar-e-TaibaandJaish-e-Mohammad,which
had ties to al Qaeda predating 9/11.30 Jaish-e-
Mohammadwasajihadigroupformerlytrained
by the Pakistan army to fight in India-adminis-
tered Kashmir; at the time of 9/11, the group
had a large following among the lower ranks of
Pakistan’s armed forces.31 Lashkar-e-Taiba, a
militant proxy group created by the ISI, alleged-
ly trained militants responsible for the
November 2008 Mumbai attacks, according to
U.S. and Indian intelligence.Bothorganizations
are believed to be so big and well-financed they
can operate independent of the state.32
Months after the official beginning of
Operation Enduring Freedom on the evening
of October 6, 2001, along with the U.S.-led air
campaign known as Operation Crescent
Wind, al Qaeda and Taliban militants poured
over Afghanistan’s border into Pakistan and
found refuge in FATA. The region—roughly
the size of Massachusetts and home to more
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than 3million Pashtuns—was an ideal sanctu-
ary. The tribes native to FATA adhere to the
pre-Islamic tribal codeofPashtunwali, whichby
custom extends assistance to strangers who
request protection.
FATA had once provided fertile recruiting
ground for foot soldiers waging jihad against
the Soviet Union in the 1980s and against
India in Kashmir and the Northern Alliance
in Afghanistan in the 1990s. Much of the
region’s inhospitable mountainous terrain
can support only foot traffic or pack animals,
making it difficult to infiltrate and to moni-
tor militant activity.
By spring 2002, less than a year after the
initial invasion of Afghanistan, that sanctu-
ary became even safer after President Bush
decided to pull most of America’s Special
Operations Forces and CIA paramilitary
operatives off the hunt for Osama bin Laden
so they could be redeployed for a possiblewar
in Iraq.33 All of these factors greatly alleviated
pressure on the remaining Taliban and al
Qaeda forces.
Between spring 2002 and spring 2008,
militants were able to consolidate their hold
over northwestern Pakistan. The growing
power ofmilitants has had ominous implica-
tions for the U.S.-led mission in southern
and eastern Afghanistan. Indeed, by the sum-
mer of 2008, the situation in Afghanistan
had deteriorated significantly.
Afghanistan Destabilized
In June 2008, the deadliest month of the
deadliest year for theUnitedStates andNATO
since the invasion, a sophisticated Taliban
assault on a Kandahar prison freed 1,200
inmates, including 350 Taliban. Attacks from
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), devel-
oped in Iraq and brought to the Afghan bat-
tlefield, have doubled in the past year. IEDs
now take U.S. and NATO lives more than any
other tactic.34
The Taliban’s presence is strongest in the
southern provinces of Helmand, Kandahar,
Zabol, and Oruzgan, and militant activity is
significant in the eastern provinces of Paktika,
Khowst, Nangarhar, Konar, and Nuristan. In
many of these areas, the Taliban have usurped
the traditional functions of a sovereign state,
collecting taxes, enforcing order, and provid-
ing basic services.35
NATO’s International Security Assistance
Forceofnearly55,000 troopsand25Provincial
Reconstruction Teams are finding it increas-
ingly difficult to combat a resurgent Taliban
while simultaneously attempting to rebuild
the war-ravaged nation.36
Many commentators argue that the major
cause of Afghanistan’s deterioration remains
poor central governance from Kabul, as war-
lords fill the vacuum left by President Karzai’s
weak and corrupt leadership.While these alle-
gations may be true, President Karzai contin-
ues to demand greater control over NATO
operations and has grown increasingly vocal
about the need to limit civilian casualties.
Most recently, he offered direct talks with
Taliban leaderMullahMohammadOmar and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, reportedly hosted by
King Abdullah in the Saudi city ofMecca.
PresidentKarzai aside,Afghanistan’spatch-
work of tribal factions, as those found in
Pakistan’s tribal areas, has proven historically
difficult to govern. The only Afghan ruler able
to secure the allegiance of warring tribes was
Ahmed Shah Durrani, who died in 1772. His
empire disintegrated soon after his death.
Aside frompocketsofWildWestconditions,
another factor contributing to Afghan-istan’s
downward spiral is the de facto al Qaeda and
Taliban sanctuaries in Pashtun and Balochi
areas of western Pakistan. NATO’s stalemate
will continue so long as militants remain pro-
tected across the border.
Militancy in Pakistan
Each of Pakistan’s seven tribal agencies are
administered by a political agent, who secures
tribal loyalties, maintains control through the
colonial-era Frontier Crimes Regulation, and
answers directly to the governorofNorth-West
Frontier Province, who himself answers direct-
ly to the president of Pakistan, who claims
direct jurisdiction over FATA.37 Traditionally,
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tribal leaders (maliks) formameeting or assem-
bly (jirga) to orchestrate consensus decisions
and to turn orders into workable policy.
But over the past several years, these tradi-
tional tribal arrangements have been slowly
breaking down. Themutilated bodies ofmore
than 150 pro-government tribal elders have
been found in FATA’s scattered hamlets.38
Terrorists expand where security is thin, and
offer their own brand of swift justice and ideal
visions of an Islamic state. Poverty, poor edu-
cation, and extremist sentiments have empow-
ered militant groups with whom the govern-
ment has never competed. Tribes, clans, and
elementsof extended familiesnot alignedwith
the Taliban fear reprisal. Only some tribal
militias (lashkars) are able to fight back.
According to senior U.S. intelligence offi-
cials, the Taliban, al Qaeda, and allied terror-
ist groups have established 157 training
camps along the tribal region, and have more
than 400 support locations in the tribal areas
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Figure 1
Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas
Source: Government Accountability Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Combating Terrorism: The United
States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally
Administered Tribal Areas, GAO-08, April 2008, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf, p. 7.
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and in North-West Frontier Province.39 The
security situation in each of FATA’s seven
tribal agencies has grown worse in the past
few years.
Bajaur Agency
One militant group that operates in the
Bajaur Agency, as well as in North-West
Frontier Province’s Swat Valley, is Tehreek-e-
Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM-Move-
ment for the Enforcement of Islamic Laws),
headed by Maulana Fazlullah.40 The area con-
tinues to be a source of Taliban recruits. In
2007, TNSM prevented children from getting
polio vaccines, as they considered them to be a
Western plot to sterilizeMuslims.41
In April 2008, TNSM tried to impose
Shariah lawformally inNWFP’sMalakanddis-
trict.ByAugustandSeptember2008,Pakistani
security forces equipped with heavy artillery
and gunship helicopters killed dozens of ter-
rorists, including foreign fighters. The aerial
bombardement displaced 200,000 locals.
Mohmand Agency
InMohmand, insurgents continually over-
run checkpoints and kidnap Frontier Corps
(FC) soldiers, the local paramilitary forces
recruited from the tribal region.42 In October
2007, militants publicly beheaded six alleged
criminals and flogged three others. In August
2008,more than75villageswere in theprocess
of evacuation due to intense clashes between
troops and local militants. Many of the mili-
tants were equipped with Kalashnikovs and
rocket-propelled grenades.
During the summer of 2008, Pakistani
officials announced a truce with local mili-
tants: the tribes agreed not to shelter foreign
militants and the military agreed not to
launch operations without consulting tribal
elders.
The deal was pursued because Pakistan’s
army and FC experienced disastrous losses in
confrontations with insurgents. Also, the
army is more inclined to fight India, not a
civil war within its borders. But since initiat-
ed, this deal and others like it have failed, pre-
cipitating a resurgence of Taliban hostilities.
The glaring weakness with the peace deals
was that they functioned more as appease-
ment rather than a concerted effort to con-
tain radicalism.
Khyber Agency
The traditional invasion route between
Central Asia and the Indian Subcontinent,
Khyber is the tribal agency through which 75
percent of U.S.-NATO supplies must move in
order to resupply troops fighting in Afghan-
istan. Supplies arrive in Pakistan’s port city of
Karachi, move north to Peshawar, and head
west before crossing into Afghanistan and
arriving in Kabul.43 The rest of the supplies
arrive via air or through the Chaman border
crossing point in Balochistan. According to
U.S. officials, American forces in Afghanistan
have stockpiled enough supplies to last a 60 to
90 day severance of the supply chain.
Over the past year, jihadist groups have
repeatedly interdicted the supply route.44 In
March 2008, dozens of oil tankers headed for
Afghanistan were attacked in the tribal town
of Landi Kotal. Sixty tankers caught fire and
35 were completely destroyed.45 That same
month, militants also set fire to over 40 oil
tankers near the Torkham border post.46 That
summer, militant group Lashkar-e-Islam
repeatedly attacked NATO supply vehicles
entering Afghanistan.47 By November, insur-
gents hijacked trucks carrying Humvees, fuel,
and other supplies. In December 2008, gun-
men torched more than 160 vehicles in
Peshawar, located on the edge of the Khyber
Pass. It was the biggest assault yet on the vital
military supply line. In February 2008, mili-
tants blew up Khyber’s redmetal bridge.
Orakzai Agency
In September 2008, locals from eight vil-
lages formed a 2,000-man force to combat
terrorism.48 In recent months, the headless
bodies of police cadets have been discovered
throughout the agency. In the past, militants
have attackedmilitary convoys using remote-
controlled devices planted along roadsides.
In Orakzai, FC soldiers have also been be-
sieged at local agency checkpoints.
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Kurram Agency
Kurram was the first point of refuge for al
Qaeda and the Taliban after the October 2001
invasion of Afghanistan.49 The agency is also
well known for its Shiite-Sunni violence,which
has now spilled over into neighboringOrakzai
Agency. In October 2006, a quarrel erupted
between the two factions overwhether a shrine
to the 18th century figure Syed Amir Anwar
Shah was meant for Sunnis or Shiites.50 In
September 2008, local newspapers reported
ongoing violence between rival tribes.
Recently, tribal elders called on the gov-
ernment of Pakistan to demolish madaris
used for training militants, while one jirga
accused the Afghan government, NATO, and
Iran of trying to kill Sunni Muslims.51
NorthWaziristan Agency
Many experts are firmly convinced that al
Qaeda’s two main leaders, Osama bin Laden
and Ayman al-Zawahiri, are based in North
Waziristan, possibly near its capital, Miram
Shah.52 In late 2005, militants declared North
Waziristan an Islamic state.53 Newspapers in
the region report that U.S. spy planes fre-
quently conduct reconnaissance flights over
the area, and that mortar shells and rockets
from across the border in Afghanistan hit ter-
rorist training camps and centers operating in
the agency. These camps are believed to be
receiving direct commands from al-Zawahiri.
SouthWaziristan Agency
In June 2008, BaitullahMehsud, comman-
der of the tribal-based Islamic movement
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which operates as
Pakistan’s version of the Taliban, claimed the
entire territory of SouthWaziristan.54Mehsud
has been accused of playing a central role in a
wave of deadly suicide attacks that engulfed
Pakistan from November 2007 through
January 2008, andwas namedbyCIADirector
Michael Hayden as the prime suspect behind
the grisly December 2007 assassination of
Pakistani politician Benazir Bhutto. Many
tribes in this agency support the separation of
FATA fromPakistan. It has also been reported
that the Taliban have three regional offices in
the area.55 South Waziristan is considered the
operations center of the Taliban and al Qaeda
and local newspapers report that U.S. drones
are seen patrolling the agency.
Spillover and Response
Two of Pakistan’s provinces adjacent to
FATA, Balochistan and North-West Frontier
Province (NWFP), have experienced spillover
from FATA’s insurgency. NATO chief of staff
for southern Afghanistan, Colonel Chris
Vernon, believes the “thinking piece” of the
original Afghan Taliban operates primarily
out of Quetta, the capital of Pakistan’s Balo-
chistan province.56
InNWFP, in areas likeKohat, Talibanoper-
ate out of local mosques and have emerged as
substitutes for Pakistani courts. Swat Valley,
only a five-hour drive from Islamabad, is con-
sidered the first “settled”district inPakistan to
have fallen completely under Taliban control.
The raid by the Pakistani government on the
Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) in Islamabad in July
2007 intensified a wave of revenge attacks
against the army and the government. Since
then, loosenetworksof suicidebombersbegan
striking Pakistan’s major cities, including
Peshawar, Karachi, and Islamabad.
Beginning in 2004, the Pakistan Army
moved between 80,000 to 120,000 solders
into FATA, and about 20,000 into NWFP’s
Swat Valley. The results have been mixed.
Many soldiers lack proper training, equip-
ment, and communication gear.57 Like most
conventional forces, their army has suffered
severe losses at the hands of elusive and adap-
tive insurgents. Over a thousand Pakistani
soldiers have been killed in confrontations
with militants. One soldier told the BBC,
“This is a country where soldiers are slaugh-
tered . . . Their bodies may be found, but not
their heads.”58
Militants also stage elaborate kidnap-
pings. In August 2007, Baitullah Mehsud
captured over 200 Pakistani troops who
offered little or no resistance.59 That embar-
rassmentwas followed inOctober 2007when
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insurgents captured dozens of Pakistani sol-
diers and paraded them in front of Western
journalists.60 Some officers admitmorale has
not been this low since the army failed to
stop East Pakistan’s secession in 1971.
A critical problem complicating U.S.-
Pakistan relations and the NATO mission in
Afghanistan is that underMusharraf, Pakistan
would target terrorists selectively, eradicating
indigenous Deobandi and Shiite militant
groups that did not share Islamabad’s broader
vision vis-à-vis India, while turning a blind eye
to the Taliban to use them as a hedging policy
in case the United States withdraws, and as a
proxy force against Karzai’s regime in Afghan-
istan that Pakistan accuses of being pro-
India.61 Some analysts even suspectOsamabin
Laden escaped capture after the 2001 invasion
of Afghanistan with a tip-off from ISI.62
But people in Washington who had
hoped Pakistan’s duplicity would disappear
along with Musharraf are likely to be disap-
pointed. Musharraf should be understood as
an extension of themilitary, as he reflects the
consensus view among the army’s corps com-
manders. Severing relations between the mil-
itary and militants has proven difficult, not
only due to ideological and strategic sympa-
thies, but because the army sometimes relies
on Pashtun militants as key informants in
the tribal region.63
U.S. officials acknowledge, however, that the
Pakistani government has captured more ter-
roristsandcommittedmore troops thanalmost
anyothernationinthe“waronterror.”64Former
Director of National Intelligence Mike
McConnell praised Pakistan’s cooperation, say-
ing Islamabad has done more to “neutralize”
terrorists than anyAmerican partner.65
Recommendation 1:
The AnbarModel—
and Its Limits
In late 2006 and through 2007, U.S. forces
in Iraq’s al Anbar province teamed up with
more than 30 indigenous Sunni tribes to fight
al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Sunni tribes agreed to
recruit thousands of men for the Iraqi army
andprovide intelligence toU.S. officials on the
whereabouts of AQI; in return, U.S. troops
helped local tribes obtainwater treatment cen-
ters and medical clinics, while Iraq’s Interior
Ministry provided supplies andother funding.
Many commentators have drawn parallels
between Iraq and Afghanistan, and Iraq and
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. But the dif-
ferences between the two in terms of geogra-
phy and socio-economic conditions will
make it difficult for U.S. forces to apply the
Iraq model to the region. Afghanistan is big-
ger than Iraq in both size and population.
Afghanistan and northwestern Pakistan are
mountainous and rural, whereas fighting in
Iraq is heavily concentrated in urban areas.
While it would be naïve to assume that a
solution in Iraq can be perfectly transplanted
onto Afghanistan and Pakistan, it would be
equally naïve to assume that the conflicts
share no common elements. On both fronts,
coalition forces confront adversaries who can
melt easily into the population. Both fronts
are plagued by elements of criminal gang-
sterism, sectarian violence, and jihadist in-
surgencies, and both conflicts are ripe for
employing proven counterinsurgency tech-
niques, such as recruiting indigenous allies,
maneuvering through tribal society, and cul-
tivating legitimacy from the local population
while employing minimal force.
U.S. Central Command should seek to
implement some counterinsurgency tech-
niques to the Afghanistan-Pakistan frontier.66
Pakistani security forces, with American tech-
nical advice, should focus on protecting the
populace and recruiting indigenous partners
to fight insurgents. It might even be necessary
todeploy small numbers—a fewdozen to a few
hundred—Special Forces personnel within
Pakistan as part of a larger covert operation in
support of local Pakistani security forces.
A light footprint is consistentwitha central
tenet of counterinsurgency: applying military
power precisely anddiscriminately rather than
employing overwhelming force. This coun-
terinsurgency approach limits civilian casual-
ties and lessens the possibility that U.S. tactics
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will serve as a recruiting tool for militants.
Moreover, civil unrest unleashed from a heavy
U.S. combat presence in the tribal areas would
strain Pakistan’s army, forcing it to quell vio-
lence and street protests elsewhere in the
country at the cost of leaving the frontier areas
evenmore unsupervised.
While Pashtun loyalties have traditionally
lain with pro-Taliban militants, the murder
and mutilation of hundreds of tribal leaders
has created the potential for a backlash simi-
lar to the anger indigenous Iraqi Sunnis
exhibited against al Qaeda’s brutality and
intimidation. Islamabad and Washington
should seek to exploit any manifestations of
such resentment among the tribes in FATA.
Tribal militias (lashkars) have succeeded in
standing up against the Taliban and al Qaeda
in the Lakki Marwat District of NWFP, and
the Char Dewal and Jalmai villages of the
Kurram Agency. But in areas like Khyber,
Kohat, Waziristan, and Swat, there appears to
be no stopping the Taliban’s spread unless
more support can be leveraged from Islama-
bad.67 Building Pakistan’s counterinsurgency
capacity must be devoted to cultivating legiti-
macy at the village level by earning the cooper-
ation of local tribes and working together to
uproot common enemies.
In late spring 2008, a 40-page classified
document leaked to theNew York Times titled,
“Plan for Training the Frontier Corps,” was
under review at U.S. Central Command.68
Known as the Security Development Program
(SDP), or “train the trainers,” the plan, initiat-
ed in October 2008, was intended to improve
security by enhancing the fighting capability
of the Frontier Corps.69 The FC inBalochistan
is roughly 80,000 strong. Approximately
50,000 FC are split betweenNWFP and FATA.
Owais Ahmed Ghani, the Governor of
NWFP, recounted to the author during her
visit to Peshawar that the FC was conducting
major military offensives against Islamic
extremist strongholds in the Bajaur Agency
for three days and nights with little water, no
food, and no sleep, thus exemplifying their
dedication. But other commentators are
more skeptical of the FC’s capabilities.
OneU.S. soldier said of them, “the Frontier
Corps might as well be Taliban . . . They are
active facilitators of infiltration.”70
Essentially, FC soldiers are Pashtuns
fighting fellow Pashtuns. If America does
decide to train the FC in counterinsurgency
operations, it will take years, andmay still not
resolve problems involving morale and moti-
vation. To guard against tribal and clan loy-
alties, FCmay be directed not to fight in their
home villages.71
During the late summer of 2008, a small
number of U.S. Army and special operation
forces began training the Special Services
Group, a commando division in Pakistan’s
army, to performgroundandair operations in
and around FATA. Working in coordination
with Pakistani security forces, more familiar
with the region’s inhospitable terrain and the
cultural and linguistic aspects of tribal society,
can offer the mission in Afghanistan a higher
likelihood of succeeding. Putting a Pakistani
rather than American face on operations in
FATA is more likely to gain local support.
Aside fromon-the-ground coordination is
an emphasis on increased human-intelli-
gence sharing. In March 2008, the first of six
joint U.S.-Afghanistan-Pakistan military
intelligence centers were opened along the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The centers are
intended to inhibit cross-border movement
and coordinate information and tactics
among U.S., Afghan, and Pakistani officials.
U.S. Brigadier General Joseph Votel said three
of the centers will be built in Afghanistan and
another three inPakistan, at a cost of about $3
million each. The centers will allow 20 people
from each of the three countries to watch live
video feeds fromU.S. spy planes, which can be
played back in real-time to ground forces on
both sides of the border.72
Unfortunately, less than a year later, U.S.
officials in Khyber report problems of lan-
guage barriers, ongoing border disputes
between Pakistani and Afghan field officers,
and mistrust among all three militaries.73
Construction of the second intelligence sta-
tion has been delayed due the recent spike in
violence. Sealing the border is impossible,
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given the hundreds of miles of rough moun-
tainous terrain—some of the most formida-
ble in the world.
General David Petraeus, chief of Central
Command, has urged amajor reassessment of
U.S. strategy in Afghanistan. Part of that strat-
egy includes leveraging diplomatic initiatives
with countries in the region, as was done in
Iraq.74 This too will prove difficult. Pakistani
officials claim India’s external intelligence
agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW),
uses Indian consulates in Afghanistan to
secretly funnel weapons to separatists in
Balochistan, andmay have even had a hand in
the September 20th bombing of the Islama-
badMarriot Hotel. In addition to the connec-
tion between Pakistan’s ISI and the Mumbai
terror attacks, U.S. intelligence officials allege
that elements of the ISI also provided support
to pro-Taliban insurgents responsible for the
July 7th bombing of the Indian Embassy in
Kabul.
Any stoking of the ongoing rivalry with
India will remain futile for Pakistan, as
India’s military superiority will allow the
Indians to keep hitting Pakistani pressure
points. The conventional balance of power
on the subcontinent will likely remain with
New Delhi, given its enormous supply of
manpower and fast-developing economy. For
Pakistan, the unparalleled level of suicide
attacks has deeply undermined the country’s
cohesiveness. That combined with the coun-
try’s chronic political instability, growing civ-
il unrest, and poor economic conditions
means Islamabad simply cannot afford to
fight a long war on its northwest border and
another war with a country six times its size
on the east.
Until hawkish elements associated with
Pakistan’s government and military estab-
lishments come to that conclusion them-
selves, or U.S. policymakers successfully
assuage Pakistani fears of Indian hegemony,
the United States and NATO will not have
the ISI’s full cooperation. If Pakistan’s army
is unable—or unwilling—to neutralize FATA’s
insurgency and U.S. forces continue attacks
by unmanned Predator drones, the collateral
damage unleashed from such independent
operations will make the Taliban appear to
be a force against injustice and consequently
undermine the very security Western forces
are attempting to provide.
During his campaign for the presidency,
Barack Obama pledged to deploy more
troops to Afghanistan and to take the fight
into Pakistan. During the second presiden-
tial debate, he said, “if we have Osama bin
Laden in our sights and the Pakistani gov-
ernment is unable or unwilling to take them
out, then I think that we have to act and we
will take them out. We will kill bin Laden; we
will crush al Qaeda. That has to be our
biggest national security priority.”75
President Obama remains unequivocal in
his commitment to continue airstrikes. But
he and his policy planners must recognize
that continuing airstrikes will undermine the
authority of President Zardari, as well as
Obama’s ability to coordinate policies effec-
tively with Pakistan’s civilian and military
leaders. The president’s national security
team must understand that the struggle
against extremism would best be waged by
bolstering Islamabad’s ability to compete
with militants for political authority in
FATA. If his administration simply increases
attacks from pilotless drones, it will only
push more wavering tribes further into the
Taliban camp, continue his predecessor’s
policy of dictation, rather than cooperation,
and undermine the perception within the
Pakistani body politic that Obama can
change U.S. policy toward theMuslim world.
Recommendation 2:
Training
Marine Corps General Anthony C. Zinni,
former chief of U.S. Central Command, said
the following about Pakistan’s army before
the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee:
Because of the historic importance of
the military as a source of stability
within the country, I believe that isolat-
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ing Pakistan’s influential military
establishment is and will continue to
be counterproductive to our long-term
interests in the region. When the U.S.
isolates the professional Pakistan mili-
tary, we deny ourselves access to the
most powerful institution in Pakistani
society . . . I believe that our strategic
interests in South Asia and beyond will
best be served by a policy of patient
military-to-military engagement.76
However, the United States cannot rely on
Pakistan’s army in its present form to be an
effective ally against America’s terrorist adver-
saries. To help overcome the army’s sinking
morale and poor performance, U.S. policy-
makersmust increase thenumberof Pakistani
army personnel trained at American military
institutions through the U.S. Department of
Defense InternationalMilitary Education and
Training program (IMET), which falls under
the DoD’s Defense Security Cooperation
Agency (DSCA).
IMET’s program for the Middle East,
South Asia Division (MSA) provides finan-
cial and technical assistance, the transfer of
defense materials, training, and military-to-
military contacts to build the capacity of
partner nations.77
Atlantic Monthly foreign correspondent
Joshua Hammer spoke with Major General
Shaukat Sultan Khan, Musharraf’s press sec-
retary until March 2007, who spent six
months in infantry school at Fort Benning,
Georgia, in 1983. Khan explained how the
American training shaped the mentality of
thousands of youngofficers of his generation.
“It helps you to establish a better relationship
andmore understanding [of the U.S. perspec-
tive]. . . . It broadens your outlook. . . . It gave
us a connection.”78
But after Congress imposed sanctions on
Pakistan following the discovery of its covert
nuclear program in1990,Hammer found that
Pakistani officers had little or no contact with
the U.S. military for nearly a generation.
Enhanced military relations may be espe-
cially important because America’s relations
with Pakistan’s military threaten to get worse
in the next few years. In Crossed Swords:
Pakistan, its Army, and the Wars Within, Shuja
Nawaz discovered that beginning in autumn
2008, conservative elements within the army,
known as Zia Bharti (Zia’s Recruits), are due to
take over many senior leadership positions.
General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, military
dictator during the Soviet-Afghan War,
encouraged the riseof Islamists in themilitary,
and many of the young recruits from those
days are now reaching the pinnacle of their
careers. This conservative group within the
army leadership may be disinclined to aid
Americans, in part because they were deprived
of advanced overseas military training when
Washington imposed sanctions. Military-to-
military training exercises engage younger
army officers by serving as a confidence-build-
ingmeasure between the two armies. Training
can hone the Pakistan army’s counterterror-
ism capabilities but also counter its tilt toward
radicalism. Exchange programs can also have
the added benefit of boosting the professional
competence of an officer corps that is respon-
sible, among other things, for managing the
country’s nuclear arsenal.
Joint military-to-military exchange pro-
grams are common. Many countries get some
type of military training in the United States,
including Israel, Kuwait and Japan. In 2006,
Pakistan’s army assigned 306 soldiers to train
in theUnited States, 157 of whomwere junior
officers.79 But this is a paltry number consid-
ering that over 600,000 soldiers comprise
Pakistan’s army.80 Significantly increasing the
number of Pakistani personnel who study in
the United States will require an increase of
the State Department’s International Affairs
Budget, as IMET is conducted solely on a
grant basis, but that seems an acceptable price
to pay given the importance of the struggle
against America’s enemies holed up in
FATA.81
To be truly effective at combating internal
insurgencies, some commentators argue
Pakistan’s armymust completely re-orient its
force structure away from conventional
threats—such as India—and toward the
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army’s bigger challenge—dealing with the
low-intensity guerrilla insurgency that the
army is presently ill-equipped and untrained
to fight. Reshaping the Pakistani army’s
conventional force structure for more adap-
tive military campaigns may be a step in the
right direction. But nimbler forces might be
inadequate for conventional warfighting.
A similar debate is brewing over the U.S.
Army’s organizing principle: whether to focus
future operations toward Iraq-style counterin-
surgencies or on force-on-force conventional
warfare. Somemilitary analysts caution that the
U.S. Army’s present infatuation with stability
operations and nation building will erode its
capacity for conventionalwarfighting.82 Leaders
in Islamabadmay want to pay attention to this
debate. For Pakistan, a greater emphasis on a
lighter force could leave it vulnerable to inva-
sions by India, large-scale internal subversions,
or political destabilization caused by economic
problems. Ultimately, Pakistan’s own civilian
leadersanddefenseplannersmustdeterminefor
themselves if insurgents or India poses a greater
threat—the United States cannot, and should
not, decide that for Pakistan.
Recommendation 3: Greater
Oversight for U.S. Aid
Stabilizing the tribal areas will also require
a more effective approach to the delivery of
economic assistance. In general, foreign aid
tends to be detrimental to a poor country’s
internal development; it discourages account-
ability and deters much-needed domestic
reforms. ButWashington’s objective is to gain
Islamabad’s support for its policies in the
region. Because economic assistance is a quid
pro quo for advancing U.S. policies, stopping
aid completely would shut a vital intelligence
link needed to neutralize regional terrorism.
Ostracizing Pakistan would also marginalize
moderate elements within the army and ISI.
Moreover, sanctions rarely achieve theobjec-
tivesweseek.U.S. relationswithCuba,Vietnam,
NorthKorea, and Iran show that punitivemea-
sures have rarely caused the target regimes to
make meaningful changes in policy.83 Indeed,
the United States has better luck engaging
those countries, as it did with Vietnam and
China in the 1970s (with Pakistan’s assistance).
Continued cooperationwith the Pakistani gov-
ernment is critical for advancingU.S. interests.
However, the United States must be more
diligent in how it manages aid. While a num-
ber of programs are classified, it is safe to say
that since 9/11, Pakistan has received close to
$20 billion in U.S. economic assistance.84 U.S.
aid to Pakistan comes from four funding
streams: coalition support funds, roughly 57
percent ofU.S. aid, considered reimbursement
for logistic, military, and other expenses in
support of U.S. counterterrorism operations;
direct budget support, approximately 15 per-
cent of U.S. aid, which are direct cash pay-
ments to the Pakistani government with little
accountability; security assistance, roughly 18
percent of U.S. aid, which allows Pakistan to
purchase major weapons systems; and devel-
opment aid, less than 10 percent of U.S. aid,
which goes toward education, democratic
institutions, and civil society.85
For now, there is no agreed-upon standard
for estimatingaid flows fromtheUnitedStates
to Pakistan. The Prevention, Conflict Analysis,
and Reconstruction Project of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies askednear-
ly 100 former and current U.S. officials how
much they thought theUnitedStates provided
to Pakistan annually. Replies ranged from
$800 million to $5 billion.86 The problem is
that because U.S. aid is not centralized any-
where within the government, different agen-
cies only know pieces of the overall budget. As
a result, there is little oversight and it is impos-
sible to properlymonitor aid.
When the aid reaches Pakistan, much of it
evaporates due to widespread corruption and
mismanagement. For example, for an eight-
month period in 2007, the United States reim-
bursed Pakistan $55 million for maintenance
costs of Vietnam-era Cobra attack helicopters.
Later, the United States discovered that the
Pakistanarmygot less thanhalfof thatamount
from the Pakistani government. That led some
Washington lawmakers to believe Islamabad
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was exaggerating costs and pocketing surplus
funds. In fact, the Government Accountability
Office found that of the over $10.5 billion in
unclassified aid given to Pakistan from 2002
through2007,$5.8billionwasallotted toFATA
and the border region; about 96 percent of that
was reimbursements.87
The continuance of aid should, however,
be predicated on the condition that no mon-
ey be spent on weapons platforms for use
against India; Pakistan’s attempt to purchase
F-16s and Sidewinder missiles is of no dis-
cernable use against militants. In response to
Islamabad’s feeble attempt to acquire naval
equipment, one congressional aide observed
caustically, “the last time we checked, the
Taliban did not have a navy.”88
Some weapons platforms are easier to detect
than others. But even in theory, tracking assis-
tance, or the purchase of dual-use weapons sys-
tems, canprovedifficult. For instance, drawinga
purelyhypotheticalscenario, ifIslamabadspends
$20 million on its military, with $15 million
against India and $5million against insurgents,
and then Washington decides to provide
Islamabad with $10 million in assistance, with
Islamabad directing $20 million against India
and$10millionagainst insurgents, theirofficials
canclaimtheyareusingall theassistancetofund
a burden they would otherwise have to bear, or
that they are employing dual-use systems on
their eastern front to freeupmore troops for the
northwest. To investigate these channels means
gettingintoPakistan’sinternalaffairsinwaystoo
intrusive for any sovereign to allow.
For many years, the U.S. government has
shoveled billions of dollars in aid into Paki-
stan without appropriate oversight. Until aid
to Pakistan is more properly monitored,
prospects for true improvement of the situa-
tion in the tribal areas are dim.
Recommendation 4:
Taking a Diplomatic
Back Seat
For 38 of its 61-year history, Pakistan has
been ruled directly by its military. The army’s
intrusion has led to a series of overhauled con-
stitutions (1956, 1962, and 1973), protracted
periods of martial law (1958–1962, 1969–1972,
1977–1985),andtheoverthrowofmultiplecivil-
ian governments (1958, 1970, 1977, and 1999).
During the Cold War, U.S. policy and assis-
tance enhanced the position of Pakistan’s mili-
tary at the expense of its civilian leaders.
Through the years, as themilitarydevotedmore
government resources toward itself rather than
toward economic and social reforms to mod-
ernize and better educate its population, Paki-
stani citizens began to connect America’s sup-
port for its military to their own deteriorating
situation.
The ascension ofmilitary leaders like Ayub
Khan, General Zia, and PervezMusharrafmay
havebeenwelcomenews tomany leaderswith-
inWashington. As amatter of political expedi-
ency, coordinating issues of military intelli-
gence and operational and tactical level
planning ismuch simplerwhendone through
a single authoritarian leader than with the
warring factions of a dysfunctional parlia-
ment. But when U.S. policymakers openly
embraced an Islamabad under one-man rule,
they appeared to also be embracing the army’s
abrogation of that country’s constitution, the
removal of its judiciary, and the silencing of its
independent media.
Over time, as Pakistani citizens began to
believe that their political independence was
being denied by political pressures from
Washington, their leader’s continued imple-
mentation of U.S. policy grew into a political
liability. Washington’s political influence has
become greatly diminished. As a result, some
of Islamabad’s policies today stand directly at
odds with our own.
Questions remain unanswered as to wheth-
erpolicywasevensubstantivelyadvancedunder
a single unaccountable agent, for example,
under former President Musharraf. While
Pakistani voters are largely unsympathetic to al
Qaeda and the Taliban, Islamists in that coun-
try exploited anti-American sentiment at the
ballot box in October 2002. Through elections
rigged in their favor, Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal
(MMA), an alliance of six fundamentalist par-
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ties, won an absolute majority in NWFP, was
the second largest party in Balochistan, and
became the third largest bloc in Pakistan’s
National Assembly. DespitemanyMMAmem-
bers having close contacts with the Taliban,
Musharraf and his military co-opted MMA to
bolster their own legitimacy.89
In September 2008, Asif Ali Zardari, the
widower of slain former Pakistani politician
Benazir Bhutto, was sworn in as the new presi-
dent of Pakistan.His pro-American stance and
his reputation as “Mr. Ten Percent,” because of
the numerous kickbacks he received from gov-
ernment contracts while his wife was prime
minister, are only some of the reasons why
Zardaridoesnothold thepublic’s trust.Onthe
other hand, opposition leaderNawazSharif, of
PakistanMuslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), has
seen his popularity soar due to his strong
opposition to Islamabad’s assistance to the
U.S.mission inAfghanistan, andhis insistence
on reseating judges deposed by Musharraf,
among other reasons.
No single Pakistani leader can or should
be the linchpin in that country’s fight against
al Qaeda and the Taliban, especially since the
country’s long-term success depends on the
strength of its civilian institutions and the
public’s repudiation of extremism.
Fortunately, Barack Obama may under-
stand that. During the second presidential
debate, inOctober 2008,Obama saidwemust
change our policies with Pakistan. “We can’t
coddle, as we did, a dictator, give him billions
of dollars and then he’s making peace treaties
with the Taliban andmilitants.”90
The new administration appears commit-
ted to strengthening cooperation not only
with the Pakistani Government but with the
Pakistani people. In July 2008, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee approved the
Biden-Lugar Enhanced Partnershipwith Paki-
stan Act of 2008. This bipartisan plan, dedi-
cated tonon-military spendingand to support
the country’s economic and democratic devel-
opment, calls for $7.5 billion over the next 5
years ($1.5 billion annually) and an additional
$7.5 billion over the subsequent 5 years. In
FATA, certainly broader access to education
and comprehensive study programs can help
to mitigate the spread of militancy among
younger generations. But a coherent distribu-
tion mechanism must be in place or else no
one will benefit.
Themajority of Pakistanis believe America’s
presence in the region is a threat to their coun-
tryandthatWashington’sgoal is toweakenand
divide the Muslim world.91 U.S. policymakers
must recognize that America’s name is still tox-
ic. Going forward, Washington’s best policy
would be to quietly assist Zardari’s new govern-
mentandencourage theruleof law,buthesitate
toembracehis leadershipandmakehimappear
to be beholden to theUnited States. If U.S. pol-
icymakers support President Zardari too
strongly, he could meet the same ignominious
fateasMusharraf—orworse, thatofhis latewife.
Nuclear Weapons:
Assessing the Risk
without Panic
Numerous and overlapping problems
make it difficult to shape a coherent U.S. pol-
icy toward Pakistan. But an added reason to
assist Pakistan, aside from the sharp rise in
violence in Afghanistan, is the fear that its 60
to 90 nuclear weapons may fall into terrorist
hands.92
Pakistan’s nuclear strategy is oriented
toward deterring a conventional military
assault by India. Dr. Peter Lavoy of the Center
forContemporaryConflict notes that one fear
among Pakistani defense planners is the pos-
sible deterioration of its conventional military
capabilities, which could then lower their
threshold for the use of nuclear weapons.93
The central tenet of Pakistan’s nuclear
strategic doctrine is minimum credible nuclear
deterrence.94 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Khalid
Kidwai,DirectorGeneralofPakistan’sStrategic
PlansDivision, revealed certain scenariosunder
which, if deterrence should fail, Pakistanwould
use nuclear weapons against India:
a. If India attacks Pakistan and con-
quers a large part of its territory (space
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threshold); b. India destroys a large
part either of its land or air forces (mil-
itary threshold); c. India proceeds to
the economic strangulation of Paki-
stan (economic strangling); or d. India
pushes Pakistan into political destabi-
lization or creates a large-scale internal
subversion in Pakistan (domestic de-
stabilization).95
Fortunately, due to security measures already
in place at the military bases that house its
arsenal of nuclear weapons, the danger ofmil-
itants seizing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons—
while possible—remains highly unlikely.96 A
key securitymeasure is the physical separation
of nuclear components. Warheads, detona-
tors, and missiles are not stored fully-assem-
bled, but are scattered separately across the
country’s 6 to 10 high-security military bases,
each equippedwith standard safeguards, such
as iris scanners, code-locked doors, and
“Permissive Action Links,” a command and
control measure that precludes unauthorized
arming and detonation of nuclear weapons.97
A sophisticated attack by terrorists also
assumes terrorists would have the necessary
trainingandtechnicalexpertise toassembleand
utilize a nuclear warhead. Because most terror-
ists possess only rudimentarymilitary training,
it is unlikely that militants can fully assemble
the nuclear components, even assuming such
weapons could be obtained.
Rather than a militant takeover of nuclear
facilities, amore worrisome scenario would be
government insiders surreptitiously obtaining
and then disseminating nuclear secrets to ter-
rorist groups. Anotherwould be nuclear assets
falling into thehandsof radical Islamistswith-
in the military, which manages the command
and control of the nuclear arsenal, or radioac-
tive materials being attacked and seized while
in transit.
Before 9/11, Pakistan’s nuclear bureaucra-
cy lacked a stringent internal vetting process.
From this system emerged Pakistan’s most
notorious nuclear proliferator, Abdul Qadir
Khan, a European-educated metallurgist
whose blackmarket network sold illicit urani-
um enrichment technology to Iran, North
Korea, and Libya.98 In 2005, Pakistan institut-
ed an American-style Personnel Reliability
Program (PRP) aimed at rooting out employ-
ees with radical tendencies or affiliations.99
PRP screening measures include background
checks, investigation of religious background,
surveillance of phone conversations, monitor-
ing of overseas travel, and periodic psycholog-
ical evaluations.100 Many officials are sur-
veilled even after they retire.
But there is onepotential problemwithpre-
sent PRP screening measures. A.Q. Khan was
neither a religious zealot nor a conservative
Islamist, but rather anardentPakistanination-
alist. Thepresent system thus remains vulnera-
ble to insiders secretly stealing sensitive infor-
mation. According to Lt. Gen. Kidwai, about
70,000 people work in Pakistan’s nuclear facil-
ities, including 2,000with “critical knowledge”
of its nuclear infrastructure.101
Although fixed nuclear facilities may be
resistant to militant infiltration, Abdul Man-
nan, Director of the Directorate of Transport
and Waste Safety at the Pakistan Nuclear
Regulatory Authority, argues that terrorists
may intercept spent nuclear fuel during trans-
portation and shipment. Radioactivematerials
in transit are harder to defend than stationary
materials, and the release of these nuclear
materials could be extraordinarily danger-
ous.102 Washington should urge Islamabad to
fully review all of its transit procedures and
offer its own expertise about rectifying any
potential deficiencies.
Aside from its own methods of self-protec-
tion, and despite the assurances from former
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
thatAmericawouldnot intercede toprevent an
Islamist takeover of Pakistan’s nuclear
weapons, there remains a possibility that the
United States would directly intervene in the
event of a nuclear crisis.103 The U.S. Depart-
ment of Energy’s (DoE) Nuclear Emergency
SupportTeamis taskedwith responding toany
type of radiological accident, anddetecting and
locating weapons-grade material before it slips
into unauthorized hands.104 The department’s
full-time emergency response units, each com-
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posed of scientists, technicians, and engineers
arepreparedtodeployanytime,anywhere inthe
world and to respond to nuclear terrorist inci-
dents—sometimes on four hours notice.105
One potential impediment to this seeming-
ly far-fetched mission is a lack of interagency
coordination in the event of an unfolding
nuclear crisis. Another is that U.S. officials
admit to having only limited knowledge of the
locationandconditionsofPakistan’sweapons.
This blind spot, even with substantial assis-
tance from the U.S. military, precludes the
Nuclear Emergency Support Team’s ability to
properly execute a direct intervention.106
Yet another fear is that the nuclear arsenal
might fall tomilitants through the election of
a radical Islamist government. This too is over-
stated. Supporters of alQaeda and theTaliban
do not make up a significant political con-
stituency. In fact, Pakistanis typically vote for
populist-socialist, left-of-center political par-
ties, such as the Pakistan People’s Party. For
example, although theMMAgained control at
the provincial level in 2002 (as mentioned
above), many have since lost those seats
because of poor governance.107 For the time
being, Islamist parties do not have enough
political traction to transform the country’s
political environment.108
Given thenumber of physical securitymea-
sures in place, the army’s robust command
and control operations, and Islamabad’s com-
mitment tohaving anuclear deterrent vis-à-vis
India, Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal appears to be
relatively safe, at least for the time being.
Gradual, covert transfer of nuclear secrets,
rather than a sudden and dramatic prolifera-
tion, is the more likely danger—and the one
policymakers should watch for.109 Finally, the
scenario of citizens electing radical Islamist
parties that might be tempted to give nuclear
technology or materials to terrorist groups
remains unlikely for the foreseeable future.
Conclusion
During the years between theColdWar and
the “war on terror,” U.S. policymakers were
unable to shape a coherent policy in Central
Asia. The United States can no longer afford
such confusion. Al Qaeda has regrouped, mili-
tants freely traverse FATA’s highly porous bor-
der to attack U.S. and NATO troops in
Afghanistan,andtheregion’s insurgency isnow
spreading to Pakistan’smajor urban centers.
Pakistan’s assistance has been critical for
preventing the convergence of global terror-
ism and nuclear proliferation. In addition to
military operations assisted by Washington
but driven by Pakistan, the new administra-
tion must increase the number of Pakistani
officers trained at American military institu-
tions through the U.S. Department of
Defense International Military Education
and Training program. Such a measure will
improve professionalismand limit the spread
of extremism in the army. This is particularly
important since the army is responsible for
the command and control of the nuclear
arsenal.
Washington will also have to continue to
provide financial incentives to induce cooper-
ation. But assistance does not justify a blank
check. Tracking where the funding goes—
before it even leaves Washington—must begin
with better coordination among U.S. govern-
ment agencies as overseen by Congress.
Anotherdifficulty is ensuring thatwhen funds
finally do reach their destination, they are dis-
tributed effectively and used to counter insur-
gents.
Most important,Washington should stop
embracing a single Pakistani leader or back-
ing a single political party. America should
not try to pick Pakistan’s political winners,
remake FATA, or expect Islamabad to toe the
line on every conceivable issue. U.S. strategy
should be narrowly tailored to securing spe-
cific objectives, and implementing the few
policies likely to achieve those goals.
U.S. policy toward Pakistan is complicat-
ed and imperfect. But the proposals outlined
above are critical to securing America’s core
interests in this turbulent part of the world.
While these steps can help limit radical activ-
ity, U.S. leaders must be prepared to accept a
less-than-definitive victory in this volatile
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region. For the foreseeable future, no initia-
tive can provide a silver bullet.
In the short and medium terms, coopera-
tion with Pakistan will be vital for the success
of America’s NATO mission in Afghanistan.
However, remaining inAfghanistan is an exor-
bitantly costly strategy that relies on conflict-
ing regional alliances, assumes that Western
values such as democracy and human rights
prevail over and above local considerations,
and requires a prolonged U.S. military pres-
ence in a perilous part of the world.
ButAmerica and itsNATOpartnerswill fail
inAfghanistan ifU.S. andPakistani leaderscan-
not overcome their strategic differences and
work together to neutralize the insurgency.
Unless Washington can make certain that ele-
ments associated with Pakistan’s government
and military establishments are not actively
assisting militants, our attempts to stabilize
Afghanistanwill remainmission impossible.
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